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ABSTRACT
In China, local governments have actively contributed to the growth of new firms. In
Russia, local governments have typically stood in the way, be it through taxation, regulation, or
corruption.
There appears to be two main reasons behind the behavior of local governments in
Russia. First, capture by old firms, leading local governments to protect them from competition
by new entrants. Second, competition for rents by local officials, eliminating incentives for new
firms to enter.
The question then is why this has not happened in China. We argue that the answer lies
in the degree of political centralization present in China, but not in Russia. Transition in China
has taken place under the tight control of the communist party. As a result, the central
government has been in a strong position both to reward and to punish local administrations,
reducing both the risk of local capture and the scope of competition for rents. By contrast,
transition in Russia has come with the emergence of a partly dysfunctional democracy. The
central government has been neither strong enough to impose its views, nor strong enough to set
clear rules about the sharing of the proceeds of growth. As a result, local governments have had
few incentives either to resist capture or to rein in competition for rents.
Based on the experience of China, a number of researchers have argued that federalism
could play a central role in development. We agree, but with an important caveat. We believe
the experience of Russia indicates that another ingredient is crucial, namely political
centralization.
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Over the last decade, China's GDP has grown at one of the highest rates
in the world, Russia's at one of the lowest. The difference has come mostly
from the growth of the new private sector. In China, the new private sector
has thrived. In Russia, it has stagnated.
'Why this sharp difference between private sector evolutions? In both
countries, the evidence paints to the importance of the behavior of local
governments. In China, local governments have actively contributed to the
growth of new firms (Oi [1992], Qian and Weingast [1997].) In Russia,
local governments have typically stood in the way, be it through taxation,
regulation, or corruption (Shleifer [1997], Johnson et al. [1997], McKinsey
[1999], and EBRD [1999].)'
There are two, main hypotheses for the attitudes of local governments in
Russia:
The first, call it "capture", is that local governments have been captured
by the initial rent holders, primarily by the old firms which dominated the
Russian economy before the transition. Iii that view, local governments have
worked both to generate transfers to these firms, and to protect them from
competition by new firms. In this first view, their hostile attitude vis a vis
the flew private sector has been deliberate.
The second view, ca.llit "competition for rents", is that their behavior
has been• instead the unintended result of administrative disorganization.
•Too many agencies have tried to extract rents from new private firms, mak-
ing it unprofitable to create or run a private business, at least legally.2
'The McKinsey study of ten sectors of the Russian economy, and of the specific obsta-
cles faced by new firms in each sector, is particularly instructive in this regard.
2Shleifer and Vishny [1993] have shown how such disorganization aM competition
for rents leads to a much worse outcome than monopoly corruption from an organized
government. Based on a survey of shops in Russia and Poland, Fl-ye and Slileifer [1997]
have shown shops in Moscow are visited by a much larger number of inspectors and
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These two lines of explanation are plausible, and not mutually exclusive.
But they raise the obvious question of why things have been different in
China. Here again, there are two main hypotheses:
The first is that the initial rent holders were weaker in China than in
Russia. China started its transition from a very low level of economic de-
velopment. Its agriculture did not rely on large collective farms, and its
industry had relatively few large entreprises. Russia, in contrast, started its
transition as a fully industrialized economy, dominated by large state firms
and collective farms. According to this view, the potential for capture was
simply more limited in China than in Russia.
The second points to the strength of the central government in China.
Thansition in China has taken place under the tight controlof the communist
party. As a result, the central government has been in a strong position both
to reward or to punish local administrations, reducing both the risk of local
capture or the scope of competition for rents. By• contrast, transition in
Russia has come with the emergence of a partly dysfunctional democracy.
The central government has been neither strong endugh to impose its views,
nor strong enough to set clear rules about the sharing of the proceeds of
growth (Treisman [1999a], Shleifer and Treisman [19991). As a result, local
governments have had few incentives either to resist capture or to rein in
competition for rents (Treismah [1999b]).
The aim of this paper is to explore this last argument, and more gen-
erally to explore the role of federalism in transition. The question is an
important one: Based on the experience of China, a number of researchers
have argued that federalism could play a central role in development (see in
particular Qian and Weingast [1997], Roland [1999].) Indeed, a new term,
"market preserving federalism" has been coined to emphasize the benefits
of decentralization for Chinese growth. We agree, but with an important
regulators than shops in Warsaw.
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caveat. We believe the experience of Russia indicates that another ingredi-
ent is crucial, namely political centralization. In doing so, we echo a theme
first developed by Riker [19641: For federalism to function and to endure, it
must come with political centralization.
1 A model of federalism and incentives.
We start by writing down a model of federalism and local government incen-
tives. The model is very simple, but it provides a convenient way to look at
the facts and discuss the issues. ThiS is what we do in the next two sections.
Think of the government as having two levels, central, and local (in other
words, ignore for the moment the fact that thete are at least three relevant
levels of government in both Russia and China: central, regional and local).
Suppose each local government faces a simple choice. It can either foster
growth, by limiting transfers of resources to sta±e and former state firms and
allowing new private firms to enter and to grow. Or it can kill growth, by
transfering resources to old firms and/or preventing new firms from being
created.
Why might a local government choose the second option? Under the
"capture" view, it may want to protect state or ex-state firms from com-
petition. Under the "competition for rents" view, it may be simply unable
to prevent bribes and corruption by local officials. Sorting out the rela-
tive importance of the two should be high on the research agenda, but is
not essential here. For our purposes, both have the sane implication: no
growth.
Let y be the additional output under growth. With appropriate normal-
ization, let y also stand for the additional amount of revenues available to the
central and local governments under growth. Let b be the private benefits
to the local government of killing growth. Under the capture interpretation,
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b may reflect the transfers back from existing firms to the local government,
in the form of bribes, cash or in-kind payments. Under the competition for
rents interpretation, Li may reflect the cost to a local government of reducing
or coordinating bribe taking by local officials.
Now turn to the central government. Assume (an assumption to which
we return later) that the central government wants to foster growth. And
think of the central government as having two main tools, a carrot and a
stick:
• Revenue sharing (the carrot): The central government can choose the
extent of revenue sharing with local governments. Let a be the share of
revenues from additional growth going to local governments: If a local
government chooses to foster growth, it gets ay in revenues. Presum-
ably, how much the local government values growth is proportional to
ay. By appropriate normalization, denote it also by ay.
It is important to distinguish between ex-.ante and ex-post a. If the
• central and the regional governments can commit to a tax sharing
schedule (net of transfers from the center back to the regions), the two
will of course be the same. But if they cannot, for instance because
the central government is broke and desperately needs funds to keep
down its deficit, ex-ante a may be well higher than the ex-post a. The
• one which is relevant to regional governments' decisions is obviously
ex-post a. We shall return to this issue below.
• Political centralization (the stick): The central government can affect
• the probability that the local government stays in powerto enjoy either
the revenues from growth or the private benefits from killing growth.
Denote by Px the probability that the local government stays in power
if it kills growth, and by Py the corresponding probability if it fosters
growth. Define p = py/pw. The value of p clearly depends first on
Federalism .
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whether local officials are appointed or elected. If they are appointed,
then presumably the central government can choose p freely and make
it as high as it wants. If they are elected, the outcome depends on
the ability of the central government to affect the outcome of the
election, through endorsement and support of specific candidates. If,
for example, the center has little control over the outcome and captureS
is important, p may be less than one: The local government may be
more likely to be reelected if it kills growth than if it fosters it.
Under these assumptions, the local government chooses growth if
Py a y > p b, or equivalently if:
pay>b (1)
The local govertiment is more likely to choose growth, the stronger the
stick (the higher p), the larger the carrot (the higher a), the larger the
growth potential (the higher y), and the smaller the benefits of capture or
the lower the costs of reining in competition for rents (the lower b). This
formula provides a convenient way of organizing .the discussion of Russia
versus China.
2 Growth, tax sharing, political centralization, and other
issues.
Before proceeding to look at the empirical evidence on the various parame-
-
térs of the model, one may well want to challenge one of the main assump-
tions of the model, namely that the central government is pro-growth, or .at
least more pro-growth than local governments. Surely, both China and Rus-
sia provide numerous examples where the policies of the central government
destroyed the economy. However, in the context of transition and change,
the assumption that the central government is less likely to be captured by
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initial rent holders than local governments seems reasonable. Local govern-
ments are smaller relative to state and ex-state firms, more directly affected
by the unemployment implications of the closing of a particular firm, more
likely to respond favorably to requests for transfers or protection. Central
governments may well be captured as well, but not necessarily by groups
opposed to growth. Capture by the "oligarchs" for example thay well lead
to a massive redistribution of wealth in their favor, but not necessarily to
lower growth.
(1) Much previous research has focused on 7,r. If growth prospects are very
good, then letting new firms enter and fostering growth is attractive. The
example of Moscow, and of its mayor, Luzhkov, comes to mind here. But if
growth prospects are dim anyway, the returns to allowing new business to
enter and grow as opposed .to protecting the old firms may be low, and y may
be small. This is particularly likely if the improvements from pro-growth
policies take a long time to materialize, and the incumbent politicians are
unlikely tO benefit from them.
If y is small, there may be very little the center can do to convince local
governments to choose growth. Even large values of a and p may not change
the inequality.
(2) Turning to the first of the two parameters which reflect the structure
of federalism, a number of recent studies have provided some evidence on
a, both for Russia and for China.3 In desOribing the evidence, we need to
distinguish between the three levels of government, central, regional and
local.
3There are enough differences between the specific regressions run in the Russian and
Chinese studies that the comparison should be taken as preliminary at this point. As
crude as it is however, it points to a substantial difference between the two countries.
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In an econometric study of the fiscal relations between Russia's local and
regional governments, Zhuravskaya [2000j has found that marginal a is only
about 0.1, giving local governments only weak incentives to increase the
tax base. No corresponding study exists for the relations between Russia's
regional and central government. Based on informal evidence, marginal a
appears higher, but not very, high. -
In an econometric study of the fiscal relations between China's regional
and central governments, Jin et al. [1999] have found a high value of mar-
ginal a, about 0.8. Importantly, they have also found that the ex-post value
of a appears very similar to the ex-ante a (i.e a as implied by the explicit
sharing rules). In other words, the central government does not appear to
expropriate the regions after the fact in the event their tax revenues are
Unusually high. No corresponding study exists for the relations between.
China's local and regional governments. Wong [1997] suggests that the na-
ture of the contracts between local and regional governments, and therefore
the outcomes, may be similar to those for the relation between central and
regional governments.
The evidence therefore suggests that a islower in Russia than in China.
Why might this be the case? One reason may be that, since 1995 (when it
started a stabilization program), the central government in Russia has been
continuously broke, and consequently eager to renegotiate its tax agreements
with regions (attempting to reduce ex-post a relative to ex-ante a). Such
renegotiation is particularly easy for the central government in Russia be-
cause it returns a significant share of its tax revenues back to the regions,
and hence has the ability to default on its promised transfers.4 Another rea-
4The notion that a fiscal crisis may lead to a low ex-post a is suggestive of the scope
for multiple equilibria: Central governments in financial trouble cannot commit to sharthg
revenues, leading to anti-growth policies by local governments, which in turn killgrowth,
making the fiscal situation worse. -
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son may be that, given the very low p in Russia, there was simply no value
of a in Russia which would have made local governments choose growth.
This takes us to the discussion of differences in p between the two countries.
(3) In China, the Communist Party has the power to appoint and fire
governors, and haè exercised this power both to support the governors whose
regions have performed well economically and to discipline governors who
have followed anti-growth policies. Perhaps as an ultimate prize, the gover-
•nors whose regions perform well have been brought into the national govern-
ment in Beijing. It is clear that, in China, p is a large number —if the power
of the Communist Party is viewed as absolute, thenp is close to infinity.
In Russia, governors are now elected, not appointed. And the ability of•
the national government to reward or penalize gOvernors through adminis-
trative and electoral support has been limited. For this reason, p in Russia
is much lwer than in China; it is arguably below 1.
This difference in political control, rather than the difference in revenue
sharing arrangements, may be the reason why inequality (1) holds for China
and not for Russia. For a high enough p, even a low a may sustain pro-growth
policies. The Chinese central government has allowed a substantial share of
tax revenues, as well as spending responsibilities, to stay with the regions,
but given its power of appointment, it might have gotten away with greater
centralization of spending. For the Russian government on- the other hand,
there may no value of a that would lead local governments to foster growth
As a result, there may have been little incentive for the centrad government
to maintain a high value of a.
It is interesting to look at the evolution of the relation between central
and regional governments in Russia in the 1990s in the light of this model.
In the early 1990s, -Russia's central government relied on the use of a > 1 for
most of the regions. It did this by taxing a few oil-producing regions, and by
using deficit finance to compensate for the resulting lack of net revenues at
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the center (Treisman [1999a]). During that period, particularly in 1992-1993,.
Yeltsin also.had administrative control over the governors, sop was higher
than afterwards. As Treisman [1999a] shows, this policy worked tolerably
well for a while, and bought the center peace with the regions.
In the mid to late 1990s, that equilibrium fell apart. First, stabilization
- policies forced the central government to reduce a for most regions, as the
central deficit had to be reduced and hence large transfers to the oblasts-
became unaffordable. Second, political decentralization and party-free gu-
bernatorial elections reduced p significantly. Third, the continued recession
reduced at least the expectation of y. In Russia's federal structure today,
equation (1) fails, because both p and a are low. As we just argued, the key
factor may be the low value of p, rather than the low value of a. To return
to Riker, the peripheralized federalism which characterizes today's Russia
may simply not be sustainable.
Our focus, on the role of political parties in Russia in achieving—or not
achieving—political centralization may be too narrow. In Russia, two forces
have become at least partial substitutes. The first is the national media..
Media companies in Russia are private, and controlled by interests closely
tied to political movements, particularly the government and the center-
left opposition. The media groups have used television and newspapers
aggressively to get their preferred candidates elected in the 1996 Presidential
election (when both supported Yeltsin) and especially in the 1999 Duma-
elections. The second centralizhg force has been the energy monopolies,
- especially Gazprom and United Energy Systems. -The first holds monopoly
- over the supply of gas in Russia; the second controls the electricity grid.
Both companies, while nominally private, have been close to the government.
Both have been used by the government to provide cheap energy, as well as
energy without payment, to cooperative regions. In this wa both have
been used to make the conduct of regional governments more responsive to
the needs of the center. How efficient or desirable these substitutes have
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been is however an open question.
3 Discussion and implications.
Our analysis has a number of implications, for China, for Russia, and for
the economic theory of federalism.
With respect to China, our analysis implies that to the extent that feder-
alism has played a helpful role in promoting China's economic growth, such
federalism relied, crucially on the centralizing role of the Communist Party.5
If the Communist Party, as it yields power in the future, is not replaced
or supplemented by other national parties which influence the appointment
or the election prospects of governors, p will fall, leading to greater rent-
seeking and lower efficiency in its federal arrangements. The message of our
analysis for China is clear: The competitive benefits of "market-preserving
federalism" emphasized by China scholars depend very much on political
centralization.
'With. respect to Russia, our analysis suggests that federalism has failed
precisely because of political decentralization. There is no question that
carefully designed tax and, other fiscal policies can raise a in Russia. These
policies would require a clearer division of tax bases between the central arid
the regional governments, as well as a division of tax collection and spending
responsibilities that does not exist today.6 Nevertheless, given the low level
of political centralization, such fiscal measures may not be enough to induce
local governments to foster growth.
5Even in China, control by the center is not absolute. Young [2000]
'argues, for example,
that political centralization has not prevented regional governments from erecting trade
barriers between provinces.
6See Shleifer and Treisman [1999J for one such proposal.
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Will centralization come, and if so what form will it take? In princi-
ple, centralization in Russia could come through the creation of national
parties which exercise influence over the governors needing their support
in elections. Centralization may alternatively take the form of greater ad-
ministrative control over governors through more aggressive bargaining over
issues that bear on their regions and remain under the control of the center,
such as the allocation of electricity and gas. Centralization may also involve
the suspension of the democratic process. Presumably, a turn to a compet-
itive national party system is more compatible with political freedom than
are the alternatives. Yet some form of centralization is probably necessary
for the federal equilibrium in Russia to change—for a switch in the sign of
inequality (1).
From this perspective, Mexico provides a very instructive, though not
in every way appealing, example. In the l920s and 1930s, the Mexican
economy presented a far more extreme version of peripheralized federalism
than Russia presents today (Diaz-Cayeros [1997]). Following the revolution,.
the Mexican states were each run by their own dictator, or cacique, who
controlled the regional sources of military power, collected the regional taxes
without remitting them to the center, and erected trade and other barriers
against other Mexican states. The result, was fiscal disorder, and econothic'
stagnation. In 1938, President Calles, with the support of the military,
transformed the FRI into a national hegemonic party. He convinced the
regional leaders to join the party and to adhere to its national'policies with
an offer of a carrot and a stick. The carrot was a promise of long, secure, and
profitable careers under the protective wing of the PRI, which would gain
control over the nomination (and effectively the election) of governors. The
stick was a threat of personal violence against the caciques who declined to
join. Nearly all joined, a few who did not were killed. As part of this deal,
the central government obtained full centralized control over tax collection
in Mexico, leaving the states to rely on transfers from the center,' as well as
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control over trade and regulatory policies that turned Mexico into a common
market. The economic benefits of the 1938 arrangement were large, but
they did come with tremendous political centralization. It may have been
"market-preserving federalism," but the political market was not the one
that was preserved.
The last example leads us to the implication of our analysis for feder-
• alism in general. This implication is not new, and draws on Riker [1964],
• yet it has been neglected in the recent discussions of China praising the
decentralization benefits of federalism. As best we can tell, the economic
benefits of decentralization obtained from federalism rely crucially on some
• form of political centralization. Without such centralization, the incentives
to pursue regionalist policies are too high, and cannot be eliminated solely
• through clever economic and fiscal arrangements. It is possible that a fed-
eral country can muddle through without political centralization, as Russia
has donein the 1990s and Brazil and India have done for longer, but some
political system of aligning the interests of national and regional politicians
is needed to get beyond muddling through.
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